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RETHINKING THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM  
THROUGH VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
1. Introduction: 
To date, the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) has failed to offer a comprehensive 
and coherent refugee protection regime. Subsequent reforms have not addressed its 
fundamental flaws. I posit that, unless we engage in a fundamental rethink of the CEAS, the 
current third phase of reform - and future reform – will not produce a CEAS that is ‘fit for 
purpose’ (COM92017) 820 final, 7.12.2017). It will not establish a stable and future-proof asylum 
framework’ (COM92017) 820 final).  
The basic question is what is the CEAS for? Here we touch on the root of the problem with 
the CEAS. the This system should first and foremost be about protection. Yet the CEAS is a 
product of fortress Europe. The CEAS was conceived as a migration control system with a 
protection dimension. The many shortcomings of the Dublin system - problems that existed 
from its inception - are testament both to the CEAS’ unfitting purpose and to the EU and the 
Member States’ inability to critically assess and overhaul the CEAS. For example, the recast 
Dublin IV proposal fails to reform the failing Dublin System (Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member 
State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States 
by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), COM(2016) 270 final, 2016/0133(COD), Brussels, 
4.5.2016). 
Paradoxically, the CEAS and more broadly the EU and EU law are founded on values and 
principles that support the development of a system that puts protection at its core and 
bring CEAS actors together to achieve this purpose. The Commission has stressed that the 
CEAS must be built on ‘strong and foundations and clear values’ (COM92017) 820 final).  
One critical value and principle is solidarity (COM92017) 820 final). However, if the CEAS is to 
develop into a protection-oriented system that upholds the EU’s values and principles -, it 
is imperative that the EU and its Member States engage in a ‘critical normative project’.  In 
this regard, I posit that vulnerability analysis offers a potent device to investigate the CEAS 
and transform it into a system that is fit for purpose. 
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2. Vulnerability analysis must be distinguished from the language of vulnerability that 
is deployed in migration policies: 
Migration policies routinely identify vulnerable groups of migrants. The construction of 
such groups is highly problematic for a number of reasons:  
 First, it creates an arbitrary binary between the vulnerable and the invulnerable. In 
doing so, it upholds the liberal theory’s fictional invulnerable subject, thereby ignoring 
a fundamental human reality => vulnerability comes with being human. This, in turn, 
yields distorted versions of human vulnerability and thus human life. Indeed, the 
construction of vulnerable groups  
For example, EU directives identify vulnerable migrant populations (e.g. ‘minors, 
unaccompanied minors, disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents with minor 
children, victims of human trafficking, persons with serious illnesses, persons with mental disorders and 
persons who have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or 
sexual violence’). Are we to assume, for example, that young adult male migrants are 
invulnerable?  
 Secondly, because vulnerability is seen as a deviation from the ‘norm’ – 
invulnerability -, it is exclusively associated with negative connotations such as harm 
and suffering. The construction of vulnerable groups obfuscates the generative 
dimension of human vulnerability. One consequence is that persons cast vulnerable 
are stereotyped and stigmatised as well as objectified and silenced. For example, 
Atak, Nakache, Guild and Crépeau observe that ‘the term “vulnerability” too often 
serves to portray migrants in a negative light, as helpless victims’ (Atak et al. 2018) 
Significantly, because vulnerability is understood as victimisation and passivity, so-
called vulnerable persons are exposed to paternalistic reponses.   
More recently, the label vulnerable has been attached to migratory situations rather than 
migrants (2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants). However, this approach 
replicates the drawbacks of the vulnerable group approach. Those migrants deemed in a 
vulnerable situation are themselves deemed vulnerable. Besides, the notion of vulnerable 
situation is equally arbitrary. Typically, the New York Declaration focuses on ‘large 
movements’ of migrants and only envisages vulnerable situations within this specific 
migratory framework. Because it ‘almost exclusively deals with the situation of migrants prior 
Workshop on ‘Migration and New Governance in the EU’, 14-15 March 2019 
University of Strathclyde 
 
 
3 
 
to their arrival in the country of destination’, it glosses over the pull factors of migration and 
destination countries’ responsibilities.  
 Thirdly, the vulnerable group approach is not the protective device that it purports 
to be. The language of vulnerability is deployed - or not - to serve migration policy 
objectives and for this reason cannot guarantee protection. Tellingly, the image of 
the vulnerable migrant does not dislodge the construction of the migrant as a problem 
and a threat; rather it participates in the securitisation of migration and migrants. 
Mainwaring observes that ‘[[i]n the Mediterranean, migrants are rendered victims 
(…); however, once ashore on EU territory, they quickly become risky, securitized 
bodies, possible villains’ (Mainwaring 2016). Revealingly, the depiction of migrants as 
the victims of ruthless smugglers conceals their vulnerability to EU and Member 
States’ policies. This instrumentalisation of the language of vulnerability in migration 
policies is further apparent in its deployment as a mere rhetorical tool. For example, 
the Returns Directive identifies vulnerable persons, there are very few provisions 
dealing with any special requirements applicable to these persons and they are not 
far-reaching. Importantly, migration policy objectives can also frustrate the 
deployment of the language of vulnerability. For instance, in December 2016, the 
Coordinator for the EU-Turkey Statement recommended that Greece reconsider the 
exclusion of vulnerable asylum seekers from transfers to Turkey under the fast-track 
border procedure.  
 
3. Vulnerability analysis: 
Vulnerability analysis is best described as a ‘critical normative project’ (Grear 2013). It offers 
a powerful device to investigate the ‘systems of power and privilege that interact to 
produce the webs of advantages and disadvantages’ in which we are located with a view to 
responding to our vulnerability (Fineman 2008). Significantly, the counterpoint to 
vulnerability is not invulnerability’; vulnerability analysis seeks to build resilience. 
Resilience is ‘the critical but incomplete remedy to vulnerability’ (Fineman 2015). Although 
nothing can completely mitigate vulnerability, resilience is what provides individuals with 
the means and ability to recover from harm, setbacks and the misfortunes that affect [their] 
life’ (Fineman 2015).’ 
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Vulnerability analysis recognises vulnerability for what it is - the ‘primal human condition’ 
(Fineman 2015). Vulnerability is indeed:  
 Universal and constant: It arises from ‘our embodiment which carries with it the ever 
present possibility of harm, injury and misfortune from mildly adverse to 
catastrophically devastating events whether accidental, intentional or otherwise’ 
(Fineman 2008). Our vulnerability further arises from our condition as embedded 
beings (Grear 2013). We are all vulnerable to the actions of others as well as 
institutions. 
 =>  Vulnerability is thus shared. 
 Particular: we ‘have different forms of embodiment and also are differently situated 
within webs of economic and institutional relationships’ (Fineman 2010-11). We 
therefore experience vulnerability in different ways. 
 Generative: we are both vulnerable to the actions of others and inescapably 
dependent on others. Thus, vulnerability ‘presents opportunities for innovation and 
growth, creativity, and fulfilment. It makes us reach out to others, form 
relationships, and build institutions’ (Fineman 2012).  
 The generative dimension of vulnerability allows us to reclaim dependency as 
something positive. It mainstreams our dependency on others and on institutions.  
 
This theorisation of vulnerability has far-reaching consequences for our responses to 
vulnerability: 
 It redefines our relationship with institutions. Vulnerability analysis recognises that 
institutions are instrumental in shaping both our vulnerability and resilience through 
the mobilisation and distribution - or not - of resilience-building resources. Fineman 
argues that this calls for a responsive state (Fineman 2010-11). However, I concur 
with Grear that we need a fuller theorisation of vulnerability analysis that recognises 
that the state is embedded within a ‘complex uneven globalised world’ (Grear 2013). 
The state is only one actor among many. These actors’ responsiveness to our 
vulnerability depends on their positioning within the plethora of processes, systems 
and institutional relationships that form the fabric of our globalised world. All these 
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actors’ responsiveness must also account for their vulnerability as human 
constructions. 
 The shared and generative dimensions of vulnerability have a critical role to play in 
achieving greater inclusiveness in the mobilisation and distribution of resilience-
building resources in our uneven globalised world.  
 Our shared vulnerability enables us to relate to ‘others’ as fellow (vulnerable) 
beings and therefore strengthens our emotional identification with ‘others’ 
(Carens 1996).  It fosters mutual understanding and yields what Radhakrishnan 
describes as ‘a deeply ethical impulse’ that enables us ‘to envision cooperations 
and solidarities across the divide and the asymmetry’ of our globalised world 
(Radhakrishnan 2003). 
 The generative dimension of vulnerability also supports greater inclusiveness in 
the mobilisation and distribution of resilience-building resources because it 
sheds a positive light on our dependency on others. 
 
4. Vulnerability and CEAS: 
Vulnerability analysis transforms the CEAS into a system that is concerned with resilience-
building, that is the resilience of all CEAS actors. These include EU and non-EU actors. 
Who are the CEAS actors? 
- Importantly, they must include persons in need of international protection. At the 
moment, they are the passive subjects of the CEAS (e.g. the Dublin system is 
essentially coercive vis-à-vis asylum seekers; they have no agency, no choice). 
- The EU and its Member States. 
- Third countries and their communities. 
Because it is fundamentally critical, vulnerability analysis prompts and supports a rethink 
of the CEAS. Importantly, fuller vulnerability analysis firmly locates the CEAS within our 
uneven globalised world so that it does not remain a self-centred, self-serving system.  
 
Vulnerability analysis promotes inclusiveness in the mobilisation and distribution of 
resilience-building resources (e.g. protection for those in need; support for those who 
provide protection) because: 
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 It recognises CEAS actors’ universal and thus shared vulnerability. As such it promotes 
emotional identification with ‘others’ (Carens 1996); and  
 The generative dimension of vulnerability enables CEAS actors to reclaim dependency 
on other human beings and on institutions as something positive.  
 Vulnerability analysis redefines relationships between all CEAS actors. 
 
Significantly, vulnerability analysis enables the CEAS to live up to the values and principles 
that are supposed to underpin it and the EU as a whole. The key value-principle is solidarity  
Solidarity has been recognised as ‘a dynamic and contextual meta-principle of a constitutional 
rank (Moreno-Lax 2017). How the CEAS understands solidarity determines its ability – or 
lack of ability – to uphold other key principles such as fair sharing of responsibility and true 
partnership.  
Solidarity has a tri-dimensional nature (Moreno-Lax 2017): 
 Vertical: institutions (including states)-persons solidarity. 
 Horizontal: inter- institutional solidarity. 
 Systemic: the whole system must foster solidarity. 
Each facet of solidarity has an internal and external dimension.  
 
To date, the CEAS has failed to uphold the value-principle of solidarity. For example, 
Moreno-Lax refers to the EU-Turkey deal as an example of ‘external non-solidarity’ (Moreno-
Lax 2017). The Dublin system provides an example of internal and external non-solidarity. Yet 
both the internal and external dimensions of solidarity are enshrined in the Treaties. See 
e.g.: 
Article 80 TFEU 
The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation shall be governed by the principle of 
solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States. 
Whenever necessary, the Union acts adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to 
give effect to this principle. 
 
Article 21 TEU 
1. The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own 
creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule 
of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, 
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the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and 
international law. 
 
Article 3(5) 
5. In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and 
contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of 
the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the 
protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the 
development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter. 
 
 
What would solidarity look like in a CEAS transformed by vulnerability analysis? 
I will sketch out what solidarity look like in a CEAS transformed by vulnerability analysis 
solidarity look like in a CEAS transformed by vulnerability analysis. 
 Internal and external vertical solidarity: the CEAS must first and foremost attend to 
refugee protection needs, whether located within or outside the EU territory. 
 Internal and external horizontal solidarity: the CEAS must foster inter-institutional 
solidarity with a view to addressing protection needs. Solidarity must extend to non-
EU institutional actors (e.g. third countries). 
 Internal and external systemic solidarity: solidarity must be fostered so that the CEAS 
can achieve its protection purpose as well as serve international protection regimes. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks: 
2 remarks: 
 I advocate fuller vulnerability analysis, but I do not advocate complacency. Caution 
must always be exercised when using the concept of vulnerability. This is because 
vulnerability the state and other institutions possess the power ‘to exploit and thwart 
its meaning and significance’ (Butler 2004). However, in my view, because 
vulnerability analysis is fundamentally critical, it can ‘maintain an ongoing reflexivity 
concerning the employment of the notion of vulnerability’ (Grear 2011). 
 The proposed transformation of the CEAS through vulnerability analysis could be 
considered unrealistic on account of its being overly idealistic. It is certainly the case 
that the proposed endeavour has an idealistic aspect. However, I posit that this must 
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not be perceived as a flaw.  Rather, an idealistic perspective is precisely what we 
need if we are to overhaul the CEAS. Indeed, some degree of idealism compels us to 
concede that our institutions and practices may not be all that they should be 
(Carens 1996). In other words, it compels us to be critical. It follows that the degree 
of idealism that comes with fuller vulnerability analysis can prevent CEAS reform 
from perpetuating this system’s shortcomings.  
 
